Schedule Risks Associated with Middle Tier Acquisition by Etemadi, Amir & Kamp, John
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Acquisition Research Program Acquisition Research Symposium
2021-05-10
Schedule Risks Associated with Middle Tier Acquisition
Etemadi, Amir; Kamp, John
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/68153
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.
Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun
 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management 
Naval Postgraduate School 
SYM-AM-21-090 
 
Excerpt from the 
Proceedings 
of the 
Eighteenth Annual  
Acquisition Research Symposium 
 
  
Schedule Risks Associated with Middle Tier Acquisition 
May 11–13, 2021 
 
Published: May 10, 2021 
Disclaimer: The views represented in this report are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
position of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the federal government. 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
Prepared for the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 93943. 
 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 
The research presented in this report was supported by the Acquisition Research Program of 
the Graduate School of Defense Management at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
To request defense acquisition research, to become a research sponsor, or to print additional 
copies of reports, please contact any of the staff listed on the Acquisition Research Program 
website (www.acquisitionresearch.net).  
 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 370 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Schedule Risks Associated with Middle Tier Acquisition 
Amir Etemadi—received a Doctor of Philosophy degree in electrical engineering from the University of 
Toronto, Toronto, Canada, a Master of Science degree in electrical engineering from Sharif University of 
Technology, Tehran, Iran, and a Bachelor of Science degree in electrical engineering from the University 
of Tehran, Tehran, Iran. He joined the faculty at the George Washington University in 2013, where he is 
currently an Assistant Professor in the School of Engineering and Applied Science in the Department of 
Electrical and Computer Engineering and the Department of Engineering Management and Systems 
Engineering. He teaches masters- and doctorate-level courses in electrical engineering and engineering 
management.  
Etemadi’s research interests include distributed generation, power system dynamics and control, 
quantitative risk analysis, and engineering management. He is the Principal Investigator on several 
current research projects, including a National Science Foundation project on geomagnetic disturbance 
impacts on power system operation and an Acquisition Research Program grant on defense acquisition 
strategies. In addition, he is also a Faculty Graduate Research Advisor in the School of Engineering and 
Applied Sciences and has supervised over 50 masters and doctoral candidates for degrees in both 
electrical engineering and engineering management. Etemadi is a member of the Institute of Electrical 
and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). [etemadi@gwu.edu] 
John Kamp—received a Doctor of Engineering in engineering management from the George 
Washington University in 2019, a Master of Engineering in nuclear engineering from Iowa State 
University, and a Bachelor of Arts in mathematics and French from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. 
Kamp joined the George Washington University research staff in 2019 and is supporting Etemadi’s 
acquisition strategy research project. He is a retired naval submarine officer with extensive experience in 
research and development and program management. His research interests include engineering 
management, maritime systems, and acquisition system research. Kamp is a Fellow in the Royal 
Institution of Naval Architects and a member of several professional associations. 
[jckamp2018@gwu.edu] 
Abstract  
Major defense acquisition programs take about 8 years to proceed from program initiation to an 
initial operational capability. Recent changes created Middle Tier Acquisition programs intended 
to deliver capabilities and products in less than 5 years. 
This research defines schedule risk as the likelihood of exceeding a duration. We developed 
quantitative models to identify significant factors and relationships. This report summarizes our 
approach and presents modeled results associated with Middle Tier Acquisitions. 
Program offices must concurrently adapt to both emergent guidance and programmatic realities. 
This research contributes to the understanding of the risks and opportunities associated with 
recent Middle Tier Acquisitions. The research results will be useful to program offices and 
acquisition leadership in executing current and future rapid acquisition programs. 
Introduction 
This research explored schedule-related risks and opportunities associated with implementing 
new rapid prototyping and fielding program authorities, modular open system architectures, and Agile 
development. We assessed schedule risks and opportunities associated with these innovations and 
identified programmatic modifications and measures to manage schedule growth. 
Research Scope  
Our research focused on quantifying the programmatic and system engineering–related 
schedule risks attributable to using rapid prototyping and fielding pathways, modular open 
systems architectures, and Agile acquisition practices. We developed quantitative models to 
identify significant factors and relationships. This report summarizes our approach and presents 
results associated with Middle Tier Acquisitions (MTAs). 
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The research applies to rapid prototyping and rapid weapon system MTA programs and 
specifically excludes programs intended to acquire services or defense business systems. It 
includes acquisition policy and management changes enacted in the 2016, 2017, and 2018 
National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs) and the Department of Defense (DoD) and 
service guidance, governance, and execution strategies implementing these changes. The 
research findings may not be valid for programs beyond these innovations. 
Research Questions and Objectives 
1. What types of programs have delivered prototypes or fielded systems within 5 years? 
2. What characterized innovative technologies and systems fielded within 5 years? 
3. How do acquisition process innovations such as Agile development and modular open 
systems affect program schedule performance? 
Research Objectives 
1. To develop a program database from publicly available sources suitable for research. 
2. To identify and quantify significant factors for rapid acquisition strategies and significant 
predictors of and risk factors associated with achieving schedule objectives. 
This paper continues with a review of recent literature in the Literature Review. A 
methodology overview in Methodology describes datasets developed from publicly available 
sources and the quantitative methods used. Results and Analysis presents the results of 
quantitative analysis, and Conclusions and Future Work summarizes research results and 
suggests future opportunities.  
Literature Review 
Schedule is an outcome. Successful past approaches include incremental or 
evolutionary acquisition strategies, exemplified by Mortlock’s (2019) case study, adopting or 
reusing existing technologies, and updating or modifying existing systems (Tate, 2016). We 
briefly review policy and highlight recent innovations and research, including open systems 
architectures, modularity, Agile development, and Middle Tier Acquisitions. 
Rapid Acquisition Policies 
Fox (2011) produced a comprehensive summary of defense acquisition reform efforts 
between 1960 and 2009 and chronicles the interplay between Congress, the DoD, and the 
defense industry. Significant changes included 
• McNamara centralized acquisition authorities and introduced budgeting, programming, 
and requirements processes within the DoD.  
• Laird and Packard instituted policies related to management by objective, decentralized 
execution, cost reforms, prototyping, identifying, and managing technical risks, and 
formalizing acquisition training. 
• Increased accountability for results with congressional legislative initiatives such as the 
Nunn-McCurdy Amendment, Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act, and Clinger-Cohen 
Act. 
Fox (2011) argued that DoD personnel did not have the expertise to implement and 
execute these reforms but emphasized the importance of congressional, DoD and industry 
leadership in creating these process and policy changes. Recent reforms starting with the 2016 
National Defense Authorization Act increasingly emphasized speed of development and 




Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 372 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Middle Tier Acquisitions 
Congress enacted Middle Tier Acquisition (MTA) processes in 2016 (NDAA, 2015, § 
804). In 2019, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment 
(OUSD[A&S]) issued a new policy directive, Operation of the Middle Tier of Acquisition (MTA) 
(Lord, 2019). This policy introduced two new acquisition paths, rapid prototyping and rapid 
fielding, which are structured for rapid start, including setting requirements or starting production 
within 6 months, and delivery of a prototype residual capability or completed fielding within 5 
years of start (Lord, 2019). The services released their own middle acquisition references 
concurrent with DoD issuance.  
The DoD introduced the Agile Acquisition Framework, bringing traditional acquisition, 
urgent acquisition, Middle Tier Acquisitions, software, business and services acquisitions into a 
common framework (Lord, 2020b). The DoD issued extensive acquisition policy revisions in 
2020, including The Defense Acquisition System (Lord, 2020b), and Operation of the Adaptive 
Acquisition Framework (Lord, 2020b). The MITRE Corporation created a comprehensive 
website collecting the DoD and service acquisition executive policy and guidance (MITRE, 
2019).  
Contracting Innovations 
Contracting strategies are critical to rapid acquisitions. The time from program start to 
contract award is in series with development and production. Most government acquisitions use 
contracts conforming to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). Several innovations exist to 
reduce procurement acquisition lead time, including 
o Modular contracting, introduced by the Clinger–Cohen Act (Clinger–Cohen Act, 
1996). The intent was reducing investment risk, product delivery times, and 
barriers to introducing new information technology (Office of Management and 
Budget [OMB], 2012). Modular contracting has expanded beyond information 
technology acquisitions to include software and hardware development and 
procurements (OUSD[A&S], 2019).  
o Agile contracting adapts contract management to support agile acquisition 
processes. Pennington (2018) notes that inherently Agile attributes such as 
incomplete requirements, incremental deliverables, and acceptance criteria make 
for challenging procurements. Contracting officers predominantly use fixed-price 
type contracts to manage Agile procurements; key issues include setting quality 
standards, definitions of done, and appropriate risk sharing (Ellis et al., 2019).  
Statutory alternatives to FAR contracts also reduce lead times, including Procurements 
for Experimentation (Procurement for Experimental Purposes, 1993), and Commercial Solutions 
Opening (NDAA, 2016, sec. 879). These simplify commercial item procurements for research 
and development. Other Transaction Agreements (Research Projects: Transactions other than 
Contracts and Grants, 1993) are legally binding agreements where generally contract- and 
grant-related Federal laws and regulations do not apply. There are three common types of other 
transactions – other transactions for prototypes, other transactions for research, and other 
transactions for production (Research Projects: Transactions other than Contracts and Grants, 
1993). 
Business Innovations 
Several advisory panels provided specific recommendations for business process 
innovations. A recent example was the Section 809 Panel, which provided extensive 
recommendations intended to accelerate acquisition processes by leveraging commercial 
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marketplaces and processes, simplifying acquisition regulations, changing resource allocation 
processes, and improving the acquisition workforce (Drabkin et al., 2016). The DoD 
implemented less than half of their recommendations as of January 2021. 
The DoD and Congress created several funding processes designed to accelerate 
technology transitions from non-traditional performers (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Research and Engineering [OUSD(R&E)], 2020). For example, the DoD Rapid Innovation 
Fund was created by Congress in 2011 and expanded in 2018 to accelerate small business 
technology transition to the DoD (NDAA, 2011). It is structured to move small business 
technology into operational use or to an acquisition program within 24 months (OUSD[R&E], 
2020). Congress did not appropriate funding for this activity in 2020. 
The Defense Innovation Unit is a different effort, embedded in Silicon Valley and 
reporting to the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USD[R&E]). It is 
focused on transitioning commercial advanced technologies to the DoD and uses an extension 
of other transaction agreement authorities (NDAA, 2015, § 815) to fund development and 
transition. It recently expanded to other locations and provides market access and non-dilutive 
capital for non-traditional defense contractors (Defense Innovation Unit [DIU], 2020). 
Rapid System Acquisitions  
Arellano et al. (2015) analyzed two successful rapid acquisition programs and noted the 
importance of direct senior leadership involvement to successful rapid acquisitions. This support 
mandates schedule adherence, requires programs to accept more risk, and creates agility to 
bypass financial and bureaucratic obstacles.  
Wong (2016) identified three long-term (replacement, expedited, or traditional) and three 
opportunistic (missed, new, or alternative) acquisition categories. In his analysis, rapid 
acquisition processes depend upon budget reprogramming for initial action, but quantities 
depend upon capability adoption and use proliferation (Wong, 2016). The recently introduced 
acquisition pathways or strategies emphasize accelerated demonstration of a prototype or 
fielding of a new capability and are consistent with Wong’s (2016) opportunistic categories. Of 
note, Congress provided statutory relief allowing transfer of procurement funds to rapid fielding 
accounts (NDAA, 2016), further supporting Wong’s (2016) analysis.  
Following Wong (2016), rapid acquisitions are a response to an emergent need—an 
immediate investment. Van Atta et al. (2016) defined “accelerated acquisitions” as those with 
requirements urgency, requirements specificity, and technology availability. They noted that 
relatively few (18 of about 330 Major Defense Acquisition Programs [MDAPs] reviewed) 
programs met these criteria and resulted from emergent urgent needs. Nine of these 18 
programs delivered a prototype or claimed initial operational capability (IOC) within 5 years of 
program start (Van Atta et al., 2016). Dougherty (2018) examined programmatic and objective 
differences between six current rapid acquisition offices, noting attributes reflecting flexibility in 
contracting, transition, and programmatic objectives. 
 Open Architectures  
Initiatives such as open system architectures intend to minimize change costs1 by 
encapsulating functions in modules, using interfaces conforming to consensus standards, and 
 
1 Congress directed DoD use of open systems, called Modular Open Systems Architectures (MOSA; 10 
U.S.C. § 2446a, 2016). MOSA development strategies emphasize module-level competition, 
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establishing processes to ensure architectural compliance (Firesmith, 2015). Watson et al. 
(2016) related design margin (what they called “excess capacity”) to the ability to evolve a 
military ground vehicle design over time. They found, given future requirements uncertainty, the 
optimal design in terms of cost and benefits of excess capacity was related to the expected 
design service life; also, excess capacity was not cost-effective when expected service lifetimes 
were below a certain value (Watson et al., 2016).  
The implications are that system designs face a choice: produce systems designed for 
changeability over a long service life or in favor of sustained production of incrementally 
evolving systems with shorter system design lifetimes. We see examples of both choices today, 
such as the aircraft carrier (changing over a long life) and commercial computers.  
Modularity 
Modularity, like open systems architectures, is a design choice to reduce complexity or 
change system function or performance without creating a new system. It partitions product 
knowledge into distinct but related processes and products. Modularity allows companies to 
develop products faster and either protects or exposes company intellectual property (Baldwin & 
Henkel, 2015, p. 1641).  
van Gent and Kassapoglou (2014) examined modularizing composite airframes and 
showed the effects on direct operating costs and fuselage weight with increasing modularity. 
They derived cost and weight values for specific flight load conditions and optimized structural 
designs. While cost and weight savings were achievable, they were reduced or lost at high 
modularity levels as modules became heavier (and more expensive; van Gent & Kassapoglou, 
2014). Chadha et al. (2018) examined redesign of a representative missile using additive 
manufacturing processes to simplify system interfaces and expand the design space. Applying 
their redesign process to selected modules and components, they presented design changes 
improving reliability and manufacturability by reducing module part count, eliminating internal 
module interfaces, and optimizing module design. While improved, the redesigned missile still 
required flight certification (Chadha et al., 2018). 
Agility and Agile Development 
Agility has multiple meanings within the DoD; it may refer to software development, 
acquisition processes, or any changeable process or product. In 2017, the DoD had few 
programs using Agile software development methods.  
Rosa et al. (2017) developed cost models for traditional (“waterfall”) and Agile software 
processes within the DoD. Notwithstanding a small Agile process dataset, they found that 
product size (source lines of code) is a valid measure of required effort and Agile methods were 
more productive than traditional (non-Agile) software development methods (Rosa et al., 2017, 
p. 36). 
Nidiffer et al. (2014) described Agile programs as “implementation-driven,” meaning 
requirements are dependent on interactions and direct communications to establish short-term 
requirements, while traditional approaches focus on documented requirements. While Agile 
helps requirements validation, there still are specific issues such as contract modifications and 
managing non-functional requirements (Inayat et al., 2015). Adams (2017) identified DoD and 
non-DoD related factors affecting DoD Agile software development adoption, including 
contracting, requirements management, training and team organization. Schoeni (2015) found 
similar cultural barriers and identified regulatory constraints.  
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Rework is a significant shortcoming of Agile processes for physical systems, as it uses 
incremental function2 delivery (OUSD[A&S], 2019). Cooper and Sommer (2016) proposed a 
hybrid development process, called Agile Stage-Gate, where Agile methods are applied within 
selected stages, such as studies and technology development, and gated with clear exit or 
“done sprint” criteria. 
Haberfellner and Weck (2005) provide an excellent overview of Agile systems 
engineering in a series of illustrative case studies highlighting the systems engineering 
challenges of designing agility (speed of change) into real systems. They show that agility is 
valuable for long-lived systems when “significant switching costs exist coupled with substantial 
uncertainty3 in the environment” (Haberfellner & Weck, 2005, p. 1463).  
Islam and Storer (2020) developed a case study examining how safety-critical systems 
development conflicts with Agile development. While qualitative and from a single case, they 
identified three broad grounds of challenges: the influence of “waterfall-like” systems 
engineering processes on Agile teams, complex customer interactions, and conflicts between 
Agile process and regulatory standards, such as upfront design requirements for hazard 
analysis conflicting with incremental Agile design (Islam & Storer, 2020).  
Production 
DoD production (inventory) quantities for traditional acquisition programs are defined by 
requirements (Wicecarver, 2017), reducing incentives to produce more than contract 
requirements. Desai et al. (2007) considered the problem for commercial durable goods 
production and found inventory holding costs and durability incentivize lower inventory. Davis 
and Tate (2020) provide several examples of how acquisition quantities change over time and 
that systems change over time such that later production versions may be quite different than 
initial deliveries.  
Physical system production at large scale requires extensive facilities. For example, in 
December 2019, Boeing and Airbus delivered 29 and 138 large commercial aircraft, respectively 
(Oestergaard, 2020). Boeing’s Everett production facility covers nearly 100 acres (Boeing, 
2020), and Airbus has five final assembly lines world-wide (Airbus, 2020). Changing production 
demand may exceed a contractor’s capacity. In such cases, leader–follower production 
strategies may be useful.  
 Reconfigurable manufacturing systems reduce short-run production overhead and 
retooling costs by modularizing production processes for an intended parts family. Commercial 
modular production firms use mechanisms such as cost-sharing agreements, hedged delivery 
dates,4 and premiums for early deliveries5 to incentivize rapid acquisitions (Zhai et al., 2016), 
and spot and future markets can be created for premium demand purchases (Cai et al., 2020). 
Asghar et al. (2018) developed a multi-objective algorithm to optimize module (machine) 
sequencing and usage (scheduling) as production demands change (p. 4397). The research 
was specific for a part production line using programmable multi-axis milling machines. Efficient 
production sequencing minimized production downtime.  
 
2 Function, also called story or story points. 
3 Examples include requirements or demand uncertainty. 
4 In this case, hedging consists of setting module delivery dates earlier than need dates, thus covering the 
module production process time uncertainty. 
5 Zhai et al. (2016) call these premiums “crashing money.” 
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The U.S. Air Force recently announced flight testing of a Next Generation Air Dominance 
prototype, developed using a “digital engineering6” based development process, asserting this 
to be a faster path to prototype demonstration than prior methods (Reim, 2020). The 
development time is not stated, but the program office was activated in October 2019, 
suggesting a short development cycle (Waldron, 2019). 
Schedule Estimating–Related Research 
Schedule risk has different definitions in the literature, ranging from the likelihood to 
achieve a predicted duration (Dubos et al., 2007) to an estimate of likelihood and consequence 
(Tao et al., 2017). Browning (1998) used causal loop representations to identify likely sources 
and consequences of schedule delays and showed how uncertainty drives risk. Thomas et al. 
(2014) extended earned value methods to estimate schedule risk within a detailed cost and 
schedule Monte Carlo simulation. Similarly, Wauters and Vanhoucke (2017) used machine 
learning techniques to simulate project schedule duration within an earned value methodology. 
Such simulations require detailed work project schedules and duration uncertainty distributions 
as inputs.  
Jaifer et al. (2020) examined effort and time drivers for aerospace new product 
development and grouped them into complexity7 and proficiency8 categories, later adding 
uncertainty as a separate category following a subject matter expert survey. Jahr (2014) tried to 
quantify the effect of Agile project management on schedule relative to traditional program 
management processes. He developed a hybrid management process for software 
development using constrained activity-on-node graphs and ran an experiment comparing 
performance to scrum processes for modification and new product development. The teams 
using the modified process were able to outperform scrum teams in terms of schedule and cost 
growth for both new and modified software development (Jahr, 2014). This suggests that 
applying planning constraints and management can benefit Agile processes such as scrum-type 
software development. 
Ingold (2014) noted that schedule durations for small software development efforts are 
approximately the cube-root of the planned effort in person-months, and the square root of 
planned effort for large efforts. He argued that Agile efforts tend to follow square root 
relationships and that while reducing schedule leads to cost growth, Agile processes are able to 
achieve schedules shorter than predicted by standard software cost estimating models (Ingold, 
2014). He developed and calibrated an Agile schedule systems dynamic model with 12 
qualitative schedule acceleration sub-factors that predicted schedule durations within a few 
percent (Ingold, 2014). His schedule-accelerating subfactors map to previously identified 
schedule factors (Riposo et al., 2014), and his people-related factors map to Jahr’s (2014) 
proficiency group.  
Discussion and Summary 
The literature provides an overview of program better practices and decisions associated 
with shorter schedules. These include  
• Reducing requirements to meet capability and deliver something sooner 
• Having a competent team and bounding the system by what is known and in use, 
including interfaces and standards 
 
6 Also called a digital thread (Bone et al., 2019). 
7 Such as size, technical difficulty, and uncertainty. 
8 Examples include experience, communications, and process management competency. 
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• Starting with an existing or proven system to reduce development delays  
• Adjusting work to retire schedule risk 
• Having sponsorship from the top and using the resulting flexibility to overcome 
inevitable obstacles 
• Segmenting integration risk 
There is extensive literature on specific manifestations of rapid acquisitions, notably 
modularity and Agile software development; however, these are focused cases and provide 
lessons learned for program management offices. The literature shows extensive development 
in policies and process supporting rapid acquisitions.  
Congress and the DoD instituted several process and statutory changes in recent years, 
such as Modularity, Agility, and Middle Tier Acquisitions. The DoD adopted these innovations to 
reduce program cycle times. There are few quantitative articles on the effects of modularity and 
Agility on schedule performance, and Middle Tier Acquisition programs as relatively new, 9 
representing a significant research gap. We focused this paper on Middle Tier Acquisitions 
schedule risk and the following research hypothesis: 
• Middle Tier Acquisition programs have lower schedule risk than traditional MDAPs. 
Methodology 
We defined the likelihood of exceeding a specified schedule duration as the schedule 
risk. We did not assess risk context, severity, or treatment, as these are program-dependent. In 
Figure 1, the vertical red dashed line indicates a schedule risk of about 0.9 (89.2%) that the 
schedule of a program in this dataset will exceed 60 months. 
 
 
Figure 1. Estimation of schedule risk 
 
 
9 Some quantitative information is in recent budget documentation. The Fiscal Year 2022 budget data 
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The key assumption is that similar program types have similar schedule durations and 
risks—in this case, MDAPs. If true, then there is a 50% chance of a similar program’s schedule 
exceeding 120 months, and about an 11% chance of exceeding 180 months.  
Research Design Overview 
We relied on several publicly available data sources for this research: the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) annual weapon system assessments, the Director, Operational Test 
and Evaluation (DOT&E) Annual Reports, FPDS.gov, and usaspending.gov. We included the 
Fiscal Year 2019 through 2021 budget documentation to identify rapid acquisition programs. We 
compiled data into comma-separated variable files that are available upon request. Contract 
data was substantial; programmatic data was sparse. We manually validated the smaller 
datasets. 
Budget data text searches were critical to labeling programs as modular, open systems, 
Agile development, Middle Tier, or Section 804 acquisitions, and claiming rapid fielding or rapid 
prototyping activities. 
We used Microsoft and Adobe text search engines, R, Minitab, and SPSS to identify 
relevant programs and significant factors. We developed simplified schedule models in Minitab 
and ran Monte Carlo simulations to estimate schedule risk for the previously-labeled strategies. 
We performed additional modeling on Air and Missile system commodity types to identify and 
characterize influential variables and test model predictive performance. 
Research Terms and Definitions 
GAO and DOT&E 2020 reports and DoD budget documentation provided most of the 
research data. We searched for programs with the following text strings: 
• “Agile development.” This is commonly a software-dominated development and delivery 
process with incremental requirements elaboration, schedule-driven product delivery and 
acceptance. Searches included “Agile,” “Agility,” and “Agile software.” Searching using 
“Agile development” provided good specificity to specific budget documents. An example 
of “Agile development” is the previously mentioned Air Force Air Operations Center 
Weapon System 10.2 (AOC-WS 10.2) replacement program. 
• “Modular system.” A modular system is often the product of a program with multiple 
components in development or production, with system function determined by the types 
of modules used to compose systems. Searches included “modular” and “modularity.” 
An example of a modular system is the Army Field Medical Equipment. 
• “Middle Tier.” This is a program or project using Section 804 (Middle Tier Acquisition) 
pathways. Searches were also conducted using “Section 804,” “MTA,” “rapid fielding,” 
and “rapid prototyping.” Prior to the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act, the DoD 
used “Agile,” “rapid fielding,” and “rapid prototyping” within budget documentation 
descriptions of program plans and strategies. Examples include the Air Force Air-
Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW) and AOC-WS 10.2  
• “Open System.” Also known as Open System Architecture & Modular Open Systems 
Architecture Explicit Interfaces, standards, composition rules (structure) Often includes 
configuration management. Examples include the Air Force F-16 Modification of In-
Service Aircraft and AOC-WS 10.2. 
Results and Analysis 
Text searches of budget documents between Fiscal Years 2010 and 2021 inclusive 
showed that Agile development and Modular system are more common in procurement 
documents, and Middle Tier and Open System are more common in research and development 
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documents. Also, the Air Force has more activity related to Agile development and Middle Tier 
Acquisitions that the other services. Figure 2 shows these trends. 
 
 
Figure 2. Term usage count summary by fiscal year 
 Figure 2 shows increasing overall usage trends for both procurement (Figure 2[a]) and 
research and development (Figure 2[b]). Agile development and open system activities are 
growing in all services. Open systems are a sustained emphasis in research and development, 
and Middle Tier Acquisition programs are a recent development. 
Modeling Middle Tier Acquisition Program Schedule Duration 
 We used data from the GAO 2020 annual weapon systems assessment and added 
Fiscal Year 2020 and 2021 budget documents to create a dataset with program cycle times or 
schedules with programmatic factors and classification using the previous labels.  
We found that modifications of existing systems were commonly occurring with modular 
systems and considered “modification” as a proxy for modular and open systems in the dataset.  
Agile development programs did not always have a clear end date or planned initial 
operational capability date. The challenge is part of determining the “definition of done” 
(OUSD[A&S], 2020), essentially when the accumulated product value meets the customer 
requirement. This is normally a software development issue and may be in-service use, date of 
authority to operate, or another defined state. This definition problem exists in Agile 
development and Middle Tier Acquisition programs. We chose either the latest specified product 
delivery date or the last date in the budget submission. 
 We subsetted the data to consider Air (AIR) and Missile (MSL) commodity type 
programs. Figure 3 summarizes the cycle times by Agile (AGILE), MDAP, modification (MOD) 
and Middle Tier Acquisition (MTA.RP).10  
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Figure 3. Cycle Times for AIR and MSL Programs (GAO, 2020) 
Figure 3 highlights that Middle Tier Acquisition programs are so new that none have 
reported schedule growth resulting in durations greater than 5 years (60 months). It also shows 
that modifications of existing systems have a smaller range and lower median cycle time than 
an MDAP does. Random forest modeling identified the most important predictor variables: time 
since program start, change in the research and development budget, the natural log transforms 
of the research and development budget, and estimated unit cost.11 We developed a 
multivariate regression, leaving out time since program start.12 Table 1 summarizes the 
multivariate regression model that excluded time since program start. 
 
Table 1. Cycle Time (Schedule) Regression Model Summary 
Factor Coefficient Contribution p-value VIF 
Intercept 1.6     
LN(R&D budget) 12.66 25.87% 0.000 1.13 
PCT change (R&D) 37.74 20.32% 0.000 1.17 
LN(Unit cost estimate) 4.97 6.75% 0.013 1.03 
MTA = TRUE -39.28 11.94% 0.000 1.03 
S R-sq R-sq(adj) R-sq(pred)  
34.74 64.88% 61.90% 51.23%  
 
We used a reduced version of this model as one estimator of Middle Tier Acquisition 
program schedule risk.  
Predicting Schedule Risk for Middle Tier Acquisition Programs 
We fitted polynomials to GAO cycle time (schedule) cumulative distributions for the four 
different program types.13 These provide a simple estimate of schedule risk following the Figure 
 
11 If not specified, then unit cost was total budget divided by planned buy. 
12 This was evaluated as reflecting the schedule growth of older programs in the dataset. 
13 The cumulative distributions could be modeled by a 3 parameter Weibull distribution. We developed 











Cycle times for Air and Missile programs 
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1 approach. Most polynomials were quadratic or cubic, with R-squared values above 95%. The 
Middle Tier Acquisition distribution was best fit by a logarithmic equation: 
 
𝑃𝑃(> 𝐷𝐷) = 1 − {0.4284 ∗ ln(𝐷𝐷)− 0.8496}, 
 
where D is the schedule duration in months. 
We ran three Monte Carlo simulations to estimate the likelihood of Middle Tier 
Acquisition programs exceeding 60 months. The first simulation (normal data fit) assumed 
normally distributed schedule durations with estimated upper (53 months) and lower (10 
months) bounds and an estimated standard deviation. The second simulation (regression 
model) started with a regression model predicting schedule distributions from program 
budgets.14 The third simulation (Weibull data fit) assumed schedules followed a Weibull 
distribution, with scale (49.7), shape (2.705), and a 0 threshold. Table 2 shows Middle Tier 
Acquisition program duration simulation schedule risk results at 5, 6, 7, and 8 years (60–96 
months). 
Table 2. Middle Tier Acquisition Schedule Risk Simulation Results 
Simulation/Model P(>60 months) P(>72 months) P(>84 months) P(>96 months) 
Normal data fit 2.7% 0.4% 0.19% 0% 
Regression model 46.6% 25.4% 11.5% 4.3% 
Weibull data fit 19.8% 7.2% 1.6% 0.2% 
poly fit 9.6% 1.7% 0% 0% 
 
 The last row (poly fit) is the estimate for the GAO cumulative schedule distribution for 
comparison with the simulations. The normal data fit simulation estimated a duration less than 
zero 2.3% of the time; 2.7% is the schedule risk of duration exceeding 60 months. The other 
models predict some risk of exceeding 60 months. Regression model results suggest that larger 
budget (greater than $1 billion) programs will be more likely to exceed 60 months. No Middle 
Tier model or simulation predicted significant schedule risk beyond 96 months.  
We modeled MDAP schedule risk as above. Table 3 summarizes MDAP schedule risk 
for the GAO data and a polynomial model. 
Table 3. MDAP Schedule Risk Simulation Results 
Simulation/Model P(>60 months) P(>120 months) 
Monte Carlo simulation 88.7% 46.7% 
Polynomial model 88% 46% 
This shows that Middle Tier Acquisition (MTA) programs have less schedule risk than 
MDAPs at the same absolute schedule duration. However, the schedule risk of an MTA and an 
MDAP at the same relative percent schedule completion are comparable. 
Conclusions and Future Work 
 The literature review provided an overview of program better practices and decisions 
associated with shorter schedules, including  
• Reducing requirements to meet capability and deliver something sooner 
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• Starting with proven technologies, interfaces, and standards  
• Having a competent team and capable suppliers 
• Adjusting work to retire schedule risk and segmenting integration risk 
• Having a plan to get to contract award and production sooner 
Middle Tier Acquisition programs can benefit from these practices and add policy limits 
on schedule durations, oversight, and stakeholder involvement to incentivize schedule 
adherence and lower schedule risk.  
This research provides insight into the schedule risk of MTA programs. Simulations 
showed the likelihood that an MTA program will exceed its planned schedule is less than 20%. 
Simulations also predict that the schedule risk for MTA programs grows with larger total 
research and development budgets (MTAs with budgets greater than $1 billion are more likely 
to exceed 60 months). 
Middle Tier Acquisition programs have less schedule risk than traditional MDAPs at the 
same absolute duration. For example, at 60 months after program start, the schedule risk for an 
MTA program should be less than 20% and over 80% for an MDAP, as the MDAP has years of 
schedule left, while the MTA is (should be) nearly completed.  
The schedule risk estimation process is extensible to other rapid acquisition innovations. 
Future work should include replicating this effort using restricted datasets and program-level 
data, validating schedule risk predictions and predictor significance with observed program 
performance, and developing context and severity estimators.  
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